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With the pervasiveness of liability insurance in modem society, the in-
surance claims process has become an important adjunct to the law of tort
liability. Whether he represents plaintiff, defendant, or an insurance com-
pany, any lawyer who litigates tort claims must be familiar with the in-
surance claims process and its pitfalls. This article will examine insurance
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claims law in Missouri with a view to providing the Missouri practitioner a
tool for sharpening his skills within the insurance claims process.
I. CLAIMS PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS AND THE CONSEQUENCES
OF NONCOMPLIANCE
A. The Requirements
Insurance contracts often contain clauses dictating the way by which
the claim is to be presented to the insurance company.' Many examples
can be noted by a brief review of policy forms used in Missouri. 2 Most of
the clauses pertain to such requirements as prompt presentment of claims,
assistance and cooperation of the insured, and arbitrtion of claims
disputes. Occasionally the requirement will be imposed by statute.
The fire insurance policy form used in Missouri is a prime example.
Written notice of loss is required immediately and proof of loss must be
submitted within a specified time period. The insured must also be
prepared to submit to examinations under oath regarding the loss and
must produce for examination books of account and the like. Further, im-
partial appraisers are to be appointed to value the loss in the event of
dispute. Under Missouri law the claimant must file with the insurance
company a statement that no taxes are owed on the damaged property.3
Similar provisions can be found in other Missouri policy forms such as
those used in life insurance, accidental death insurance, uninsured
motorists insurance, and professional liability insurance.
B. The Consequences of Noncompliance
Provisions concerning the way in which claims are to be presented to
the insurer are often said to impose a qualification on the claimant's ability
to successfully pursue a claim, as opposed to an obligation. In other words,
these provisions merely afford the insurer a defense against payment of a
claim and do not give it an action for affirmative relief in the event the
claimant fails to comply with a given claims requirement of the policy.4
The question of when a defense to the liability of the insurer is raised
by noncompliance has often been litigated. Is any noncompliance a
defense, or must the noncompliance have somehow prejudiced the in-
surer? A requirement of prejudice is not normally found in the policy itself;
1. See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 440 (1971). See also
13 & 14 R. ANDERSON, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 49, 50,
51:100-239 (2d ed. 1959); 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§
4731-4787 (2d ed. 1962).
2. For additional specific discussion of Missouri insurance policy forms, see
Mo. Bar C.L.E., Missouri Insurance Practice (2d ed. 1977).
3. See RSMO § 139.110 (1969).
4. R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 440.
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rather, it is recognized by the majority of the courts as a form of judicial
regulation.5
The Missouri courts consider prejudice as an important factor to be
considered and appear to fall within this majority position that imposes the
requirement of prejudice to the insurer in the absence of a forfeiture clause
before noncompliance can afford the insurer a defense. 6 Missouri views
such requirements in most instances as a mere qualification and not an
obligation; the policy provision thus falls short, in most instances, of being
construed as a condition precedent to the liability of the insurer.
There is always the possibility that such claims processing re-
quirements might be altogether waived by the insurer. This is particularly
the case where the insurer expressly denies liability before the required act
is to occur.7 In at least three Missouri cases, the courts have recognized that
a waiver of a claims processing requirement can occur where the insurer
denied liability.8
The degree of impact on the rights of the parties resulting from the re-
quirement of prejudice depends in large part on the allocation of the
burden of proving or disproving the existence of prejudice.9 Many courts
have adopted the position that prejudice is presumed from lack of com-
pliance thus placing the burden of disproving prejudice on the claimant;
however, a few courts have placed the burden of proving prejudice on the
insurer.' 0 It would appear that when the burden is placed on the insurer
the impact of the prejudice doctrine is great, while if it is placed on the
claimant it is less substantial. " Missouri, apparently placing emphasis on
5. See id. at 441. See also 14 R. ANDERSON. supra note 1, at §§ 49:421,
51:101; 8J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, at § 4773.
6. See, e.g., Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1969); McNeal
v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 540 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976);
Cox v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 520 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974);
Reese v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 205 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970);
Schultz v. Queen Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 230 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965); Halferty v.
National Mut. Cas. Co., 296 S.W.2d 130 (K.C. Mo. App. 1956); St. Paul &
K.C.S.L. R.R. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 231 Mo. App. 613, 105
S.W.2d 14 (K.C. 1937); Walker ex rel. Foristel v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 229
Mo. 1202, 70 S.W.2d 82 (St. L. 1934).
7. See 14 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 51:114-:116, 49:751-:924; 8J.
APPLEMAN, supra note 1, §§ 4747, 4786.
8. See Wilson & Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 300 Mo. 1, 254 S.W. 266
(1923); Otto v. Farmers Ins. Co., 558 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977);
Cohen v. Fort Dearborn Cas. Underwriters, 221 Mo. App. 741, 285 S.W. 1024
(K.C. 1926).
9. See 8J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4732; R. KEETON, supra note 1, at
441-45.
10. See 8J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4732.
11. See, e.g., Billington v. Interinsurance Exch., 71 Cal. 2d 728, 456 P.2d
982, 79 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1969); Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 303, 384
P.2d 155, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1963); Western Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 258 Iowa
460, 137 N.W.2d 918 (1965); Mountainair Mun. School v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 80 N.M. 761, 461 P.2d 410 (1969). 3
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the requirement of prejudice, has allocated the burden of proving
prejudice to the insurer.12
All of this begs a major question regarding the prejudice doctrine.
What is the standard of prejudice? Numerous standards have evolved.
Some courts require a showing that due to the noncompliance the result
was different in a particular case, with relief being limited to the dif-
ference in result shown. Others require only a showing of a substantial
likelihood that the result would have been different but for the non-
compliance. The majority simply requires a showing that the claim is
substantially more dangerous, onerous, or troublesome because of the
claimant's noncompliance. 13 The position of the Missouri courts regarding
the standard of prejudice appears to coincide with the first or second of the
three positions. 14Arguably, it seems preferable in most situations to take
the less rigorous posture of the majority third position mentioned above:
There is good reason for declining to enforce a rigorous re-
quirement that the insurer prove that a different result has occur-
red in a particular case because of the insured's breach. In relation
to a defense of late claim, for example, the very delay of which the
insurer complains has deprived it of the normal opportunity for
early investigation that might have disclosed defenses, if they ex-
isted. Thus, it can never be known whether the case is in fact one in
which the result would have been different. If the insurer is de-
prived of its defense unless it can prove that a different result
would have come about in a particular case, it must pay a whole
body of claims some of which it could have defeated but for the
delay of presentment. Narrowing the insurer's defense in this way
would produce injustice not only to the insurer but also to other
policyholders whose premiums must pay for this risk if the insurer
is required to bear it.' 5
In any event, Missouri's apparent non-adoption of the majority position
increases the impact of the prejudice requirement on the insurer's poten-
tial defense of noncompliance.
C. Arbitration- The Special Claims Processing Requirement
Special mention should be made of clauses in insurance policies which
require resolution of claims disputes by arbitration. It is well known that
courts have traditionally expressed concern over binding arbitration
12. See Cox v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 520 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1974); Dixon v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 155 S.W.2d 313 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1941); St. Paul & K.C.S.L. R.R. v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 231 Mo. App. 613, 105 S.W.2d 14 (K.C. 1937); Walker ex rel. Foristel v.
American Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Mo. App. 1202, 70 S.W.2d 82 (St. L. 1934).
13. See R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 442-44.
14.' See Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1969); Walker ex rel.
Foristel v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Mo. App. 1202, 70 S.W.2d 82 (St. L.
1934).
15. R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 444.
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clauses in contracts. Such clauses in the insurance policy have been treated
with similar concern and in some instances with notable hostility.1 6 A basic
fear exists that the parties will lose their day in court. In particular, con-
stitutional problems are raised when the arbitration clause affects third
party rights or when the only insurance coverage available includes ar-
bitration clauses as a standard part of the policy form.' 7 The courts are
split as to the enforceability of arbitration clauses with most jurisdictions
resorting to legislation to determine enforceability. 8
Arbitration clauses are occasionally found in Missouri policy forms;
most notably, an arbitration clause may be placed in the uninsured
motorist section of the standard automobile insurance policy. Missouri has
by statute taken the position that the clause is unenforceable before
award.' 9 In light of this apparent legislative mandate, little change on the
arbitration issue can be expected. Since the arbitration clause is unen-
forceable, noncompliance with such a clause before award is obviously of
no consequence.
II. NONPAYMENT AND LATE PAYMENT OF A CLAIM BY THE INSURER
While the preceding section concentrated on requirements applicable
to the claimant, this section turns to a requirement applicable to the in-
surer. Generally, the insurer is required to pay claims promptly. Failure to
do so without justification results in potential liability of the insurer under
statutory law in many jurisdictions. 20 When is an insurer justified in not
paying a claim or in delaying payment of the claim? The test varies from a
reasonableness test, to a bad faith test, to a mere requirement of denial of
payment test, depending upon the statute of the local jurisdiction. In
Missouri, the legislature has provided as follows:
In any action, suit or other proceeding instituted against any in-
surance company .... upon any contract of insurance issued... in
this state ... to a resident of this state ... if the insurer has failed
16. See id. at 452.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d 606 (1969);
Boughton v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 354 P.2d 1085 (Okla. 1960); Barnhart v. Civil
Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965). See also CAL.
INS. CODE § 11580.2(f) (West Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.792(1)(a)
(1969).
19. See RSMO § 435.010 (1969); Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
374 S.W.2d 606 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963); State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963). See also Annot., 24
A.L.R.3d 1325, 1334 (1969). It should be noted that once an award is made by an
arbitrator, the award will be enforced. See RSMO § 435.020 (1969). It should be
noted also that Missouri has treated appraisal clauses in insurance policies as en-
forceable. See Dworkin v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 285 Mo. 342, 226 S.W. 846
(1920).
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or refused for a period of thirty days after due demand therefore
prior to the institution of the action, suit or proceeding, to make
payment under and in accordance with the terms and provisions of
the contract of insurance, and it shall appear from the evidence
that the refusal was vexatious and without reasonable cause, the
court or jury may, in addition to the amount due under the provi-
sions of the contract of insurance and interest thereon, allow the
plaintiff damages for vexatious refusal to pay and attorney's fees as
provided in section 375.420.21
While the above-mentioned statutes are strictly construed due to their
highly penal nature, 22 Missouri courts have made it clear that the question
of reasonableness will be determined as the facts would have appeared to a
reasonable man before trial. 23 Each case is of course to be considered on its
own merits. 24
The question of who may sue under the Missouri statute has been the
subject of litigation. The courts have held that only the policyholder or his
assignee may sue2 5 while expressly denying a judgment creditor of the
policyholder the use of the statute. 26
III. THE LIABILITY INSURER'S DUTY OF DEFENSE
Within the claims process, there is no more formidable duty than the
liability insurer's duty to defend its insured. The duty of defense is the
result of a right given the liability insurer- the right to control the defense
of the claim and thereby protect its own interests as well as those of the in-
sured. 27 Since this right is crucial to the insurer, the corresponding duty is
accepted by the liability insurer pursuant to policy provisions even if the
claim is groundless, false, or fraudulent. 28 Such agreements to defend have
21. RSMo § 375.296 (1969) (emphasis added).
22. See Howard v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 17, 164 S.W.2d 360 (1942);
Housing Auth. v. Bauman, 512 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
23. See Pfingston v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 330 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. 1969);
Housing Auth. v. Bauman, 512 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974);
Duckworth v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 452 S.W.2d 280 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1970).
24. See, e.g., Cox v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 520 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1974); Citizens Discount & Inv. Corp. v. Dixon, 499 S.W.2d 231 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1973); Locke Distrib. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 407
S.W.2d 658 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966); Hammontree v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 385
S.W.2d 661 (Spr. Mo. App. 1965); Irelan v. Standard Mut. Assoc., 379 S.W.2d
815 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964); Evans v. Great N. Life Ins. Co., 237 Mo. App. 317,
167 S.W.2d 118 (K.C. 1942).
25. See Still v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 374 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1963).
26. See Corder v. Morgan Roofing Co., 355 Mo. 127, 195 S.W.2d 441
(1963).
27. See 7A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4681; 14 R. ANDERSON, supra note
1, § 51.32; R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 483-84.
28. See R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 462.
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been specifically upheld in Missouri upon the rationale that the insurer has
a vital interest in the defense of a claim.2 9
A. When the Liability Insurer Must Defend; the Standard of
Conduct If It Defends
Whether or not the liability insurer must defend depends upon the
coverage of the policy and the nature of the claim which is usually
established by the pleadings. 30 This general principle is firmly entrenched
in Missouri law, 3' but application of the principle is a difficult matter.
Typical of the situations in which problems may arise are cases where the
pleadings take no position one way or the other on some point deter-
minative of coverage; or where the pleadings allege by surplusage only
facts that are decisive of coverage; or where the pleadings include claims
within and outside the coverage; or where the actual circumstances known
by the insurer fall within coverage but the facts alleged in the pleadings fall
outside of coverage; or where no pleadings have as yet been filed.3 2
In Missouri, it is clear that the general principle of when the insurer
must defend will be superseded should the insurer have knowledge of ac-
tual facts that would bring the claim within the coverage. Indeed, even
where an insurer's reasonable investigation would have uncovered such
facts, the duty to defend is present. 33 Thus, if the pleadings do not allege a
cause of action within the coverage of the policy, but the insurer knows of
facts that would bring the claim within the coverage, the duty to defend in
most instances is present. Additionally, this could arguably place a duty of
defense on the insurer even prior to the filing of the claimant's pleading.
On the other hand, if the claimant's pleading alleges facts that if proven
would be within the coverage of the liability policy, the insurer must
29. See General Serv. Corp. v. Allhoff Bros., 139 S.W.2d 1062 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1940).
30. See 7 A. J. Appleman, supra note 1, §§ 4682-4686; 14 R. ANDERSON,
supra note 1, §§ 51.32-.49.
31. See, e.g., Ward v. State Farmers Mut. Tornado Ins. Co., 441 S.W.2d 1
(Mo. 1969); Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968); Benningfield v.
Avemco Ins. Co., 561 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978); Ranger Ins. Co. v.
Silverthorn, 553 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); Moore v. MFA Mut. Ins.
Co., 422 S.W.2d 357 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390
S.W.2d 558 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haglund, 387
S.W.2d 230 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965); MFA Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 336 S.W.2d 123
(K.C. Mo. App. 1960); Simpson v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 327 S.W.2d 519 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1959); Interstate Oil Co. v. Equity Mut. Ins. Co., 183 S.W.2d 328
(K.C. Mo. App. 1944).
32. See R. KEETON. supra note 1, at 462-77 for an excellent discussion of
these problem areas.
33. See Marshall's U.S. Auto Supply v. Maryland Cas. Co., 354 Mo. 455,
189 S.W.2d 529 (1945); State ex rel. Interstate Oil Co. v. Bland, 354 Mo. 622,
190 S.W.2d 227 (1945); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co.,
567 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978); City of Palmyra v. Western Cas. &
Sur. Co., 477 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
412 [Vol. 44
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always defend even if it has knowledge of facts that would take the claim
outside the policy's coverage.- 4
A special problem is raised where several causes of action are asserted
by the claimant. Is the insurer's duty to defend, and likewise the insurer's
right to control the defense, present if some of the causes of action are
within the policy's coverage and some are outside the coverage? It is clear
that the liability insurer in Missouri must still defend its insured. 3 But
neither the insurer nor the insured can exclude the other in the defense of
the total action.3 6 Such cases also present the ugly specter of a conflict of
interest making it both advisable and mandatory that the insurer advise
the insured of his right to separate counsel. A similar problem is raised
where more than one liability insurer may be liable on a single cause of ac-
tion. Here the companies cannot exclude each other; they must cooperate
in the defense. 37
Underlying the determination of when the liability insurer must de-
fend is the claims processing requirement that the insured assist and
cooperate with the insurer in its defense. To have an effect on the duty of
the insurer to defend, the lack of assistance or cooperation must be pre-
judicial to the insured.3 8 Additionally, Missouri makes it clear that the in-
surer must take reasonable steps to obtain the insured's cooperation. 39
Assuming the insured breaches this duty and thereby prejudices the in-
surer, the insurer's duty to defend is released. 40
Also underlying the determination of when the liability insurer must
defend is the claims settlement process itself. What is the effect of an in-
surer's tender or payment of the policy's limits- is the insurer's duty to de-
fend discharged on the ground the insurer no longer has a stake in the
defense? While research uncovers no Missouri authority in point, there are
a few cases from other jurisdictions that touch on the problem. The cases
reflect inconsistent results that in large part depend upon the specific
policy provision. 41
If the liability insurer is uncertain whether the claim will ultimately
fall within the policy's coverage, it has two alternatives. First, it could
bring an action for a declaratory judgment by which a court would make
34. See Mistele v. Ogle, 293 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. 1956); Benningfield v.
Avemco Ins. Co., 561 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978).
35. See Butters v. City of Independence, 513 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. 1974).
36. See Compton Heights Laundry Co. v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur.
Corp., 195 Mo. App. 313, 190 S.W. 382 (Spr. 1917).
37. See 7A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4681.
38. See MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thost, 561 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1978).
39. See Kitchen v. McCullough, 428 S.W.2d 907 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968).
40. See Quisenbury v. Kartsonis, 297 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. 1957); Lenhart v.
Rich, 384 S.W.2d 812 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964); Finkle v. Western Auto. Ins. Co.,
224 Mo. App. 288, 26 S.W.2d 843 (St. L. 1930).
41. See R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 479-82. See discussion Part V(D) infra.
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the determination. The obvious problems here are the expense of the addi-
tional suit and the potential loss in time in processing the claim at issue.
Second, it could defend. However, to defend can be construed as a waiver
of the insurer's right to thereafter contest its liability even where the in-
sured has breached a condition of the policy. 42 Missouri courts have so held
where the insurer had knowledge of noncoverage under the policy.4 3 The
insurer, however, may defend without waiving its rights to later contest its
liability if it defends pursuant to a non-waiver of rights agreement with the
insured or at least notifies the insured of its reservation of rights."
If the liability insurer does defend its insured, the standard of its con-
duct comes into question.45 Missouri has indicated that the insurer must
defend with due care and in good faith.46 This standard appears to be con-
sistent with the majority of jurisdictions throughout the United States.47
B. Consequences of an Improper Refusal to Defend
Assuming the duty of the liability insurer to defend is present, serious
consequences will result if the insurer refuses to defend.4 8 Generally, from
a national viewpoint, the insurer must pay the amount of the judgment
(up to the policy limits) ultimately rendered against the insured, even
though the insurer was by its absence not in control of the defense. 49 There
is even some authority that requires the insurer to pay for a judgment in ex-
cess of the policy limits if the insurer's failure to defend caused the excess
judgment.5 0 The insurer must also pay the insured's attorney's fees and
other costs incurred in defending the action of the claimant. 51 The insurer
may be liable for all of the above even if the insured settles the claim prior
to judgment.5 2 If the insurer refuses payment or delays payment
42. See 7A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4692.
43. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 485 S.W.2d
397 (Mo. 1972); Kitchen v. McCullough, 428 S.W.2d 907 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968);
Luck v. Fort Dearborn Ins. Co., 54 S.W.2d 757 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932).
44. See 7A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4694; 14 R. ANDERSON, supra
note 1, §§ 51:77-:87. For Missouri authorities, see Linenschmidt v. Continental
Cas. Co., 356 Mo. 914, 204 S.W.2d 295 (1947); Myers v. Continental Cas. Co.,
223 Mo. App. 781, 22 S.W.2d 867 (St. L. 1929); Royle Mining Co. v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co., 161 Mo. App. 185, 142 S.W. 438 (Spr. 1912).
45. For general discussion, see 7AJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4687; 14 R.
ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 51:74; R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 471.
46. See St. Joseph Transfer & Storage Co. v. Employers Indem. Corp., 224
Mo. App. 221, 23 S.W.2d 215 (K.C. 1930).
47. See authorities cited note 44 supra.
48. See 7AJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, §§ 4689, 4691; 14 R. ANDERSON,
supra note 1, §§ 51:50-:73.
49. See R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 485.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 484.
52. Id. at 486. See also 7AJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4690.
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unreasonably, the insurer may also incur an additional statutory
penalty.5 3
In Missouri the ramifications of a breach of a duty to defend are evi-
dent from a review of relevant case law. First, refusal to defend waives all
other relevant claims requirements contained within the policy.5 4 Second;
the liability insurer will be liable for the amount of the judgment up to the
policy limits.5 5 While research discloses no cases holding the breaching
liability insurer liable for judgment in excess of the policy limits, the argu-
ment appears open if the breach of the duty to defend caused the excess
judgment. Third, the insurer in Missouri will be required to reimburse the
insured for his attorney's fees and other costs of defense. 56 Fourth, such
liability remains where the insured settled the claim before judgment.57
Finally, the insurer, if it refuses such payments or delays in making such
payments unreasonably, will be liable for the statutory penalties set forth
in RSMO sections 375.296 and 375.420. Thus, as can be seen, the decision
to refuse to defend the insured should be considered carefully to avoid
these adverse consequences.
IV. EXCESS LIABILITY-THE LIABILITY INSURER'S DUTY TO
THE INSURED REGARDING SETTLEMENT
As discussed in Part III, the liability insurer has a vital interest in con-
trolling the defense of its insured when a claim is made against the insured
that falls within the policy's coverage. Because of this interest the liability
insurer is given the right to control the defense, but with it takes on the cor-
responding duty to defend with due care and in good faith. As a further in-
cident of this interest, the liability insurer is given the right to control set-
tlement and along with it the corresponding duty to settle the claim with
due care and in good faith. If the insurer fails to settle the claim within the
policy limits for failure to exercise due care and good faith, and a judg-
ment thereafter results in excess of the policy limits, the insurer will be
liable for the entire judgment.55 Missouri has recognized such liability
resulting from the right to control settlement of a claim and a breach of a
duty to do so in good faith.5 9
53. See discussion Part II supra.
54. See Butters v. City of Independence, 513 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. 1974).
55. See Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Main, 295 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Mo.
1968); Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
56. See Centennial State Bank v. SEK Constr. Co., 518 S.W.2d 143 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1974).
57. See National Battery Co. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 226 Mo. App. 351,
41 S.W.2d 599 (K.C. 1931).
58. See 14 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 51:1-:30; 7AJ. APPLEMAN, supra
note 1, §§ 4711-4715; R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 508-21.
59. See Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950);
Carthage Stone Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 274 Mo. 537, 203 S.W. 822 (En Banc
1918); Dyer v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1976); Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965). 10
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A. The Standard of Conduct and Nature of the Duty
It has been correctly stated that there are two basic questions pertain-
ing to the standard of conduct to which the liability insurer will be held in
the performance of its duty to the insured regarding settlement. First, is
the test one of bad faith or one of negligence? Second, what degree of con-
sideration must the liability insurer give to the insured's interest as op-
posed to its own?60
In Missouri the test is clearly one of bad faith; use of a standard related
to the concept of negligence has been expressly rejected. 61 Bad faith is
evidenced by the intentional disregard of the financial interests of the in-
sured.62 Whether or not equal consideration must be given to the insured's
financial interests is not clear in Missouri, although the prevailing view in
other jurisdictions is that the insurer must give the insured's financial in-
terest at least equal consideration.6 3 However, it has been held in Missouri
that a total disregard of the insured's financial interest is evidence of bad
faith.6 4 The burden of proving bad faith is of course on the insured. 65
The action brought by the insured sounds in tort.66 The Missouri
Court of Appeals has recently articulated the elements of this cause of ac-
tion.67 According to the court of appeals the insurer must have assumed
control over the negotiation, settlement, and legal proceedings brought
against the insured. However, it must be noted that at least in one case
where the insurer improperly refused to defend, it was still held to a duty of
good faith regarding settlement. 68 The court of appeals also indicated that
the insured must have demanded that the insurer settle the claim. This ele-
ment of the cause of action tends to restrict the availability of the action in
comparison with some jurisdictions. Indeed, some jurisdictions have ex-
pressly held that neither a demand by the insured that the company settle,
nor an offer by the claimant, are prerequisites of liability in excess of policy
limits.6 19 Finally, the insured must establish that the insurer refused to set-
tle within the limits of the policy in bad faith.
What if there is an offer to settle in excess of the policy limits but the in-
sured is willing to pay the excess? The duty to settle can still be present.7 0
60. See R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 510-11.
61. Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950);-Dyer
v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976);
Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
62. See Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950).
63. See R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 511.
64. See Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Dyer v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 1976).
68. See Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558 (K.C. Mo. App.
1965).
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However, the insurer must be careful not to solicit a contribution from its
insured without making it clear it is ready to contribute the entire policy
limit. To do otherwise evidences the insurer's preference to its own in-
terests over the insured's.7 1 This point has been emphasized in a Missouri
case. 72
B. Consequences of Breach by the Liability Insurer of Its
Duty to the Insured Regarding Settlement
If the insured establishes a breach of the settlement duty the measure
of damage is the excess of the judgment over the policy limit. 73 This basic
principle is recognized in Missouri. 74 Some jurisdictions have also allowed
recovery for mental suffering. 75 Missouri has indicated that punitive
damages will be recoverable if the insurer acted maliciously, willfully, in-
tentionally, or recklessly, although damages pursuant to RSMO sections
315.296 and 375.420 for vexatious refusal to pay a claim have been held in-
applicable. 76
The question of who may sue for breach of the settlement duty must
also be answered. Clearly the insured may sue. However, in Missouri, the
judgment creditor of the insured may not sue on this cause of action.7 7
Whether an assignee of the insured may sue is undecided in Missouri;
other jurisdictions are split on the issue.7 8
A related question can also be raised as to when the insured may bring
suit for breach of the settlement duty. Must the insured have paid
something on the judgment, or is the mere fact of the judgment having
been rendered against him sufficient? This question has not been raised in
Missouri. 79 However, one author suggests the following as a reasonable
resolution of the problem:
Is it possible to formulate a workable doctrine that fully pro-
tects the insured from loss and yet does not in fact result in either a
penalty to the insurer or a windfall to the claimant? Perhaps so.
The aim should be to make the insured whole (placing him in the
same position he would have been in had there been no breach by
71. Id.
72. See Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950).
73. See R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 515.
74. See cases cited note 61 supra.
75. See R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 515.
76. See Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950).
77. See Linder v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 472 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Mo. En
Banc 1971).
78. For a case denying an assignee the right to sue, see Dillingham v. Tri-
State Ins. Co., 381 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. 1964); for a case allowing an assignee to
sue, see Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1976).
The latter probably represents the majority position. See R. KEETON, supra note
1, at 518 n.16.
79. See R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 519. See generally id. at 516.
1979]
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failure to settle) at minimum cost and without reducing the
amount the claimant could have realized upon his rights against
the insured if there had been no cause of action for liability in ex-
cess of policy limit .... This might be done by permitting a single
recovery against the insurer on the excess liability claim, at the in-
stance of either the insured or the claimant, in an amount equal to
the insurance and assets not exempt from legal process, and
holding that the claimant's tort judgment aginst the insured is
fully discharged by payment of this sum to the claimant either by
the insured or by the insurer on the insured's behalf.80
V. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR THE INSURER WITHIN THE
CLAIMS PROCESS
The claims process is replete with possible conflicts of interest for the
insurer. This is particularly the case in the liability insurance field. Con-
flicts may be raised that affect the presentment of claims and defenses.
They also can taint the settlement process. While it is impossible to con-
sider all such potential conflicts, this section of the article will discuss some
of the common situations that result in a potential conflict of interest for
the insurer. It should be noted that where possible Missouri authority will
be cited. However, to portray a more complete picture of conflict of in-
terest within the claims process, this section will in large part be based on
authority outside Missouri.
A. Where More Than One Party to an Action Is Insured by
the Same Insurer
It is relatively common for more than one party in an action to be in-
sured by the same insurance company. The plaintiff and the defendant, or
co-defendants with antagonistic interests, may be insured by the same car-
rier particularly if that insurance carrier is a company of great size.
In such a situation a conflict inevitably must arise. For example, it is to
the insurer's benefit that neither party recover from the other where the
plaintiff and the defendant are both covered by the same insurer. Irrespec-
tive of any benefit to the insurer, where co-defendants have adverse in-
terests but are covered by the same insurance carrier, the conflict is ob-
vious. 8 8
When such a conflict is present, each insured must select his own
counsel and this will suffice to fulfill the insurer's duty with regard to
representation.8 2 However, the insurer cannot control the representation
80. But see Wessing v. American Indem. Co., 127 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Mo.
1955) (cause of action for at least nominal damages is alleged even though the
plaintiff has not paid any part of the excess judgment).
81. For a good general discussion of this problem, see 7A J. APPLEMAN.
supra note 1, § 4681 at 264 n.7.10.
82. See, e.g., Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 394 P.2d
[Vol. 44
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of that party due to the conflict . 3 The counsel must be paid for by the in-
surer. s 4 The selection preferably should be made by the insured. 5 If,
however, the insurer must make the selection of counsel, the counsel pro-
vided should not be associated with the firm representing the other party;
in short, the counsel must truly be separate and independent.8 6 Finally,
immediate notice of the conflict should be given the insured so he has time
to obtain separate counsel or to adequately prepare for the trial.8 7
B. Where an Action Involves Claims Within and Outside of
the Policy's Coverage
The insurer can find itself in a conflict of interest where the claimant
has made claims against its insured, some of which fall within the policy's
coverage and some of which do not fall within such coverage. Often the
claim outside the coverage of the policy actually involves a specific exclu-
sion.
Such a situation has arisen in Missouri. In Compton Heights Laundry
Company v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corporation
Limited, of Perth Scotland, 88 it was made clear that a conflict was present
in such a situation. There, the court emphasied that each party could pro-
tect his own interest but neither could exclude the other from the defense
of the case.
A more extensive analysis of how to deal with the problem was offered
by a Rhode Island court.8 9 An insured in such a circumstance may accept
the services of the insurance company's attorneys after full disclosure of the
conflict is made. However, as indicated in the Compton case, an insured
may also refuse such services. The Rhode Island court indicated that if
such a refusal occurs the insurer's desire to control litigation must yield to
its obligation to defend. Two options then are present. First, the insured
presumably could select his own attorney to represent him on all claims,
571, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1964); O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 161 P.2d 28,
aff'd, 167 P.2d 483 (1946); Yeomans v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 N.J. Super. 48, 324
A.2d 906 (1974).
83. See O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 161 P.2d 28, affd, 167 P.2d
483 (1946).
84. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730 (7th
Cir. 1976); Rimar v. Continental Cas. Co., 50 App. Div. 2d 169, 376 N.Y.S.2d
309 (1975).
85. See Jaeger v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 53 App. Div. 2d 637, 384 N.Y.S.2d 848
(1976); Executive Aviation, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d
799, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971).
86. See Hammett v. McIntyre, 114 Cal. App. 2d 148, 249 P.2d 885 (1952).
87. See DeGraw v. State Sec. Ins. Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 26, 351 N.E.2d 302
(1976).
88. 195 Mo. App. 313, 190 S.W. 382 (Spr. 1917).
89. See Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 240 A.2d 397
(1968). 14
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the attorney being paid by the insurer. Second, and perhaps more likely,
the insurer and the insured could both be represented by separate
counsel- the scope of authority of each depending upon the nature of the
claim that is within or outside the policy. Regardless of which option is
taken by the parties, the Rhode Island court concluded that the insurer
must be given the chance to approve selection of counsel although such ap-
proval cannot be unreasonably withheld.
It should be mentioned that a particularly common problem area
within this topic is where the liability policy covers injuries negligently in-
flicted by the insured but not intentionally. A conflict of interest is present
if the claimant asserts both bases of liability and should be approached as
discussed above. 90
C. Where the Claim is in Excess of Policy Limits
Where the claimant asserts a claim that exceeds the policy limits, a
conflict of interest arises for the insurer. The well-known case of Murach v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company91 established that it is the
duty of the insurer to disclose the conflict to its insured and to advise the in-
sured to retain separate counsel.
It should also be noted that the American Bar Association in conjunc-
tion with the Conference Committee on Adjustors, have adopted the
following principle pertaining to this conflict of interest:
The companies and their representatives, including attorneys, will
inform the policyholder of the progress of any suit against the
policyholder and its probable, results. If any diversity of interest
shall appear between the policyholder and the company, the
policyholder shall be fully advised of the situation and invited to
retain his own counsel. Without limiting the general application
of the foregoing, it is contemplated that this will be done in any
case in which it appears probable that an amount in excess of the
limit of the policy is involved, or in any case in which the company
is defending under a reservation of rights, or in any case in which
the prosecution of a counterclaim appears advantageous to the
policyholder.92
The principle is applicable to other conflicts of interest arising in the
claims process and should be considered in that light as other sections of
this present topic are discussed.
90. For cases illustrating this particular conflict of interest, see Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 64 11. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976); Brohawn v.
Transamerican Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975); Utica Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Cherry, 45 App. Div. 2d 350, 358 N.Y.S.2d 519, motion denied,,68 Misc. 2d
514, 362 N.Y.S.2d 532, order affd, 38 N.Y.2d 735, 343 N.E.2d 758, 381
N.Y.S.2d 431 (1974).
91. 339 Mass. 184, 158 N.E.2d 338 (1959).
92. 7A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4681 n.9.15.
[Vol. 44
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D. Where Policy Limits Are Exhausted and the Insurer Has
No Economic Interest
As discussed in Part III, the insurer has an interest in controlling and
defending any claim brought against its insured that could fall within the
policy's coverage. However, if the policy limits have been paid or if a
tender of settlement up to the policy's limits has occurred, the insurer's in-
terest arguably disappears as the outcome of it's potential liability cannot
worsen. In a sense, this involves a problem at least akin to a conflict of in-
terest- a lack of a sufficient interest.
It has been held that even where there is no actual conflict of interest
present, if the insurer had no economic motive for a vigorous defense, the
insured should not be required to give up control of the defense to the in-
surer. 93 Arguably, if the policy limits have been tendered or paid, such an
economic motive is lacking and the insurer has no right to defend. This
argument has been accepted in some jurisdictions even to the point where
the duty to defend is said to be discharged.9 4 However, there is a definite
split of authority on the question and research indicates the question has
not been judicially considered in Missouri.95 Further, where the insurer
lacks economic motive, it has been argued that to allow the insurer to con-
trol litigation is contrary to legal restraints against corporate practice of
law.9 6 Again, as one commentator puts it, "the point is debatable." 97
Naturally, the contents of the policy itself should be examined if the issue is
present.
E. Miscellaneous Situations Raising the Spector of a Conflict
of Interest for the Insurer
It is impossible to discuss all potential situations that could arise within
the claims process that would place the insurer in a position of a conflict of
interest. Additionally, there is a dearth of case law in Missouri on the pro-
blem. This subsection will simply make reference to other relevant
Missouri cases and some other possible situations creating potential con-
flicts of interest for the insurer.
It has been asserted previously within this article that if the insurer is
uncertain as to whether a claim falls within the coverage of its policy, it
may proceed to defend under a reservation of rights or non-waiver agree-
ment.9 8 In a sense, this places the insurer in a posture that could potential-
93. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730 (7th
Cir. 1976).
94. See Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 I1l. App. 2d 235, 194 N.E.2d 489
(1963); R. KEETON, supra note 1, § 7.6(c).
95. See 14 R. Anderson, supra note 1, § 51:49; R. KEETON, supra note 1, §
7.6(c).
96. See 7AJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4682.
97. R. KEETON, supra note 1, § 7.1(c) at 480.
98. See discussion Part III supra.
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ly conflict with the best interests of the insured. Thus, in Missouri where an
insurer defends under a reservation of rights or a non-waiver agreement, it
has no right to control the defense over the objection of the insured. 99
In Missouri, there is a special conflict of interest problem growing from
an insurance claim dispute that directly affects the counsel selected by the
insurer. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that where an attorney was
selected by an insurer to represent both the company and the insured, and
during the claim process it was determined the insurer had no liability, the
insurance company's attorney could not properly go forward to represent
the insured. The court held that continued representation would con-
stitute unprofessional conduct because of the potential conflict of interest
engendered by the situation. 0 0
Another problem results where there are multiple insurers interested
in the defense of the same party in the same case. Since to exclude an in-
surer from the defense would be contrary to its legitimate interests in the
defense of the claim, the multiple insurers are required to work together
toward their common objective. In short, no one insurer can exclude
another. 10'
Other conflicts of interest can be raised where multiple claims under a
per accident limit of coverage are made by claimants, as settlement of one
claim may exhaust or nearly exhaust the limit which would have an
adverse impact on the total loss suffered by the insured above the limit of
the policy; or where the settlement on one claim acts as a bar to a
reciprocal claim; or where there are close relations between the insured
and the claimant; or where uninsured motorist's coverage is involved and
because of the relationship between the claim of the insured against the
uninsured motorist to the claim of the uninsured motorist and others
against the policyholder the conflict results. To do more than merely raise
these possible conflicts of interest is beyond the scope of this article. 0 2
VI. DIRECT ACTIONS AND JOINDER OF THE LIABILITY INSURER 0 3
The insurer, being vitally interested in the proper defense and
ultimate settlement of the claim, will normally involve itself in the claims
process and will normally pay the claim if settlement occurs or a judgment
against its insured is entered. However, if the liability insurer refuses
99. See Butters v. City of Independence, 513 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. 1974).
100. See Helm v. Inter-Insurance Exch., 354 Mo. 935, 192 S.W.2d 417
(1946).
101. See Krutsinger v. Illinois Cas. Co., 10 Ill. 2d 518, 141 N.E.2d 16 (1957).
102. For an excellent discussion of these problems, see R. KEETON, supra
note 1, §§ 7.7, 7.9 & 7.10.
103. In other than liability insurance, the insured claimant can bring direct
action against its insured provided all prerequisities within the policy have been
complied with. For an excellent discussion of such direct actions, see Mo. Bar
C.L.E., Missouri Insurance Practice §§ 11.2-.33 (2d ed. 1977). For an excellent
discussion of direct actions against the liability insurer, see id. at §§ 11.34-.62.
422 [Vol. 44
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liability from the outset, the question is often presented as to whether the
injured claimant may sue the insurer directly by joining the insurer in the
claimant's action against the insured.
Most liability policies do not allow such direct action, nor does the
prevailing rule, whether judicial or statutory, allow direct action. 10 4 The
principal reason for the policy clause or the judicial or legislative rule is to
require adjudication of the tort action against the insured without involv-
ing the insurer as a party with resulting prejudice to the insurer before the
jury.
The courts and the legislature in Missouri have adopted this principle.
A judgment is necessary before an action can be brought directly against
the insurer. 105 Once the judgment is obtained, the claimant has the choice
between two possible avenues of recovery against the liability insurer.10 6
Both avenues of recovery involve garnishment proceedings. So-called
equitable garnishment can be pursued 10 7 or general garnishment pro-
cedures could be selected. 0 8 In any event, the tort claimant cannot seek
direct recovery prior to judgment against the insurer.
I VII. SUBROGATION
In some instances the insurer may be required to pay a claim and yet
may have recourse against another party to recoup its "loss." This windfall
right of some insurers is embodied in the concept known as subrogation.10 9
The nature of and right to subrogation is hereinafter explored.
A. The Theoretical Base and Limitations
Subrogation gives to the insurer the right to recover its loss from the
party who caused the loss irrespective of any contractual or any other legal
relationship with the party who caused the loss. Otherwise stated, even
though the insurer receives a premium from its insured as compensation
104. See J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, §§ 4861-4866.25; R. KEETON, supra
note 1, § 7.11 at 534-35.
105. See Clarke v. Organ, 329 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1960); Cotton v. Iowa Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 363 Mo. 430, 251 S.W.2d 246, appeal transferred, 260 S.W.2d
43 (K.C. Mo. App. 1952); State ex rel. Anderson v. Dinwiddie, 359 Mo. 980, 229
S.W.2d 985 (1949); Haines v. Harrison, 357 Mo. 956, 211 S.W.2d 489 (1948);
Martinelli v. Security Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); State
ex rel. McCubbin v. McMillian, 349 S.W.2d 453 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961);
Taverno v. American Auto Ins. Co., 232 Mo. App. 820, 112 S.W.2d 941 (K.C.
1938).
106. See Pennsylvania Comity Co. v. Phoenix, 139 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1944).
107. See RSMo § 379.200 (1969).
108. See RSMO ch. 525 (1969); Mo. R. CIv. P. 90.
109. For an excellent discussion of Missouri subrogation law, see Mo. Bar
C.L.E., Missouri Insurance Practice, ch. 10 (2d ed. 1977). For a review of
subrogation at the-national level, see 7J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, §§ 4051-4054;
11 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, §§ 6501-6533; R. KEETON, supra note 1, § 3.10.
423
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for its promise to pay the loss, the insurer in some situations can recover the
amount of the claim from the party who caused the loss. Initially the right
was one created by the court of equity that can exist even in the absence of
a contractual provision providing for such. 110 Under modem authority,
any party who pursuant to a legal obligation has paid for an injury
resulting from the wrong of another may be subrogated to the rights of the
party to whom payment was made against the wrongdoer. The right is
given to such a party because of his secondary liability.'
There are some serious limiations to the insurer's right of subrogation.
First, the insurer's right must be based on its secondary liability-the in-
surer cannot be a mere volunteer. 1 2 Second, the insurer cannot be
subrogated against its own insured." 3 To allow the insurer to subrogate
against its own insured would obviously defeat the very purpose for which
the insurance contract was made; but, the question of "who" the insured is
in a given case may not be so obvious.'1 4 Third, public policy in Missouri
prohibits assignment of tort claims for personal injury (such as wrong done
to the person, reputation, or feelings) and personal contracts (such as con-
tracts in contemplation of marriage). '15 Finally, in Missouri a cause of ac-
tion cannot be split without permission of the defendant against whom the
claim is asserted." 6
With the aforediscussed limitations on the right of subrogation in
mind, it would be beneficial to delineate those insurers who may seek
subrogation against a party who caused loss to their insured. The discus-
sion is contained within a footnote and is limited to those insurers recog-
nized to date by the Missouri coirts or legislature as having a subrogation
right.'
110. See Loewenstein v. Queen Ins. Co., 227 Mo. 100, 127 S.W. 72 (1909);
Knight v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 268 S.W.2d 53 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954).
111. See Cole v. Morris, 409 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1966).
112. See Loewenstein v. Queen Ins. Co., 227 Mo. 100, 127 S.W. 72 (1909).
113. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 405
S.W.2d 530 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haglund, 387
S.W.2d 230 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
114. See, e.g., cases cited note 113 supra.
115. SeeJones v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 497 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1973).
116. See Subscribers at Cas. Reciprocal Exch. v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co.,
230 Mo. App. 460, 91 S.W.2d 227 (K.C. 1936), overruled on other grounds,
Kaup v. Luthjohan, 360 S.W.2d 321 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
117. Subrogation has been allowed in the following cases and situations: Cole
v. Morris, 409 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1966) (workmen's compensation); Lumberman's
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kansas City Ft. S. & M. Ry., 149 Mo. 165, 50 S.W. 281 (1899)
(property insurance); Cable v. St. Louis Marine Ry. & Dock Co., 21 Mo. 133
(1855) (property insurance); Kroeker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466
S.W.2d 105 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971) (uninsured motorist insurance); General
Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Young, 206 S.W.2d 683 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947), affd, 212
S.W.2d 396 (Mo. 1948) (automobile insurance); McKenzie v. Missouri Stables,
Inc., 225 Mo. App. 64, 34 S.W.2d 136 (1930) (workmen's compensation);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wabash Ry., 74 Mo. App. 106 (K.C. 1898); RSMo §
424 [Vol. 44
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There are also some serious limitations on the right of subrogation
even after the right has been properly exercised. The rights of the insurer
against the paty who caused the loss can be no greater than those of its in-
sured to whose position the insurer is subrogated.118 Similarly, the insurer
will be subject to the same defenses to which its insured was subject. 119
B. Enforcement of the Subrogation Right-Procedural Difficulties
The insurer traditionally has tried to keep its-name out of lawsuits. The
principal reason for this reluctance to be the named plaintiff in a subroga-
tion suit is that the jury might be unduly prejudiced against allowing
recovery by an insurance company against an individual defendant. The
question of when the insured must be a party to the subrogation action is of
great interest and has been often litigated in Missouri.
The mere exercise of the insurer's right of subrogation is not sufficient
to make the insurer a necessary party to the subrogation action; instead,
there must be a full assignment of the insured's claim to the insurer. If
there is full assignment, the insurer must be the named plaintiff.1 20 In
other words, if there is no assignment, or if the assignment is incomplete,
the insured is the real party in interest; if the assignment is complete, the
insurer is the real party in interest.' 21
Mention should be made of special problems that have developed in
this field. When the loss is covered by more than one insurer and all in-
430.350 (1969) (where a surety pays the state); RSMO §§ 430.230-.250 (Supp.
1975) (hospital "liens"); RSMO § 379.203(4) (Supp. 1975) (uninsured motorist in-
surance).
Subrogation has been denied in the following cases and situations: Jones v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 497 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. App. 1973) (medical insurance);
MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huddleston, 459 S.W.2d 104 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970) (stan-
dard mortgage clause in a fire insurance policy does not give mortgagee right of
subrogation where note and mortgage are not in default); Forsthove v. Hardware
Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 208 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967) (funeral
benefits); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 405
S.W.2d 530 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966) (automobile insurance-subrogation against
permissive user); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1965) (medical insurance); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haglund, 387
S.W.2d 230 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965) (automobile insurance-subrogation against
permissive user).
118. See Monsanto Chem. Co. v. American Bituminuls Co., 249 S.W.2d 428
(Mo. 1952).
119. See Holt v. Myers, 494 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. App. 1973).
120. See Steele v. Goosen, 329 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. 1959); American Family Ins.
Group v. Wilcoxson, 572 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jessee, 523 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975); Bauer v.
Holtkamp, 389 S.W.2d 850 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965); Hayes v. Jenkins, 337
S.W.2d 259 (Spr. Mo. App. 1960). See also RSMo § 507.010 (1969); Mo. R. CIV.
P. 52.01.
121. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jessee, 523 S.W.2d 832 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1975); RSMo § 507.010 (1969); Mo. R. CIV. P. 52.01.
20
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surers join to pay the claim, the assignment of the insured's claim will be
split among the various insurers. In such a situation, Missouri allows the
subrogation action to be brought in the name of the insured.1 22 Another
special problem develops where the insured has released the party who
caused the loss against whom the insurer wishes to subrogate. If such oc-
curs where the tort-feasor knew of the possible subrogation, the insurer's
subrogation right is unaffected at least where it did not give its consent.
23
However, if the tort-feasor was unware of the potential subrogation claim
and the release makes no provision for such, the insurer loses its right to
subrogation altogether. 24
VIII. CONCLUSION
For the lawyer whose practice is not confined to the insurance claims
field, the insurance claims process presents a formidable body of law to be
dealt with. Although this article has not sought to critically analyze in-
surance claims law or exhaustively list the cases in this area, it does outline
the insurance claims process and the important decisions and statutes
regarding it. This article is intended as a tool for the practitioner and by its
use it is hoped the Missouri practitioner will be able to more effectively
deal with the insurance claims process when he encounters it in his prac-
tice.
122. See Liebstadter v. Brooks, 421 S.W.2d 547 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); Swift
& Co. v. Wabash Ry., 149 Mo. App. 526, 131 S.W. 124 (K.C. 1910).
123. See General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Young, 212 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. 1948);
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 360 S.W.2d 314 (St. L. Mo. App.
1962).
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